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Abstract—We show that the Quantum Generative Adversarial
Network (QGAN) paradigm can be employed by an adversary
to learn generating data that deceives the monitoring of a
Cyber-Physical System (CPS) and to perpetrate a covert
attack. As a test case, the ideas are elaborated considering the
navigation data of a Micro Aerial Vehicle (MAV). A concrete
QGAN design is proposed to generate fake MAV navigation
data. Initially, the adversary is entirely ignorant about the
dynamics of the CPS, the strength of the approach from the
point of view of the bad guy. A design is also proposed to
discriminate between genuine and fake MAV navigation data.
The designs combine classical optimization, qubit quantum
computing and photonic quantum computing. Using the
PennyLane software simulation, they are evaluated over a
classical computing platform. We assess the learning time and
accuracy of the navigation data generator and discriminator
versus space complexity, i.e., the amount of quantum memory
needed to solve the problem.
Keywords: Autonomous Aerial Vehicle, Micro Aerial Vehicle,
Cyber-Physical Security, Covert Attack, Photonic Quantum
Computing, Quantum Computing, Quantum Generative
Adversarial Network, Quantum Machine Learning.
I. INTRODUCTION
CPSs comprise physical processes monitored and controlled
through embedded computing and networked resources. Sig-
nals to actuators and feedback from sensors are exchanged
with controllers using, e.g., wireless communication. The
advantages of such architectures include flexibility and rel-
atively low deployment costs. Nevertheless, the perpetration
of cyber-physical attacks must be addressed. The problem
is particularly challenging when the CPS consists of disrup-
tive technologies such as MAVs, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles
(UAV), Unmanned Underwater Vehicles (UUV) and MAV
swarming.
Today’s cybersecurity solutions, from in-depth defense
techniques (e.g., firewalls) to intrusion detection and cryp-
tographic techniques, aim to prevent system breaches from
happening. However, several stories of attacks and disruption
of CPS exist (e.g., from the Stuxnet worm incident affecting a
Iran’s atomic program [7] to recent incidents in Saudi Arabia
affecting Houthi drones [9]). CPS protection solutions must
manage and take control over adversarial actions. Protection
must be built taking on the adversary mindset, predicting its
intentions and adequately mitigating the effects of its actions.
In this paper, we explore the use of the QGAN paradigm
to address cyber-physical security issues in the domain of
MAVs. A concrete QGAN design is proposed to generate fake
MAV navigation data. Initially, the adversary is entirely igno-
rant about the dynamics of the CPS. From the point of view
of the adversary, it is the strength of the approach. A design
is also proposed to discriminate between real and fake MAV
navigation data. The designs combine classical optimization,
qubit quantum computing and photonic quantum computing.
We build upon the PennyLane quantum machine learning
software platform [3]. In particular, we reuse and adapt ideas
from the variational classifier [21] and QGAN [22] examples.
We evaluate our approach using the simulation capabilities
of PennyLane. We measure the learning time and accuracy of
the navigation data generator and discriminator with respect
to the space complexity, i.e., the amount of quantum memory
used to solve the problem. At the outset, we acknowledge that
the exponentially growing time complexity in the number
of qubits of our solution is a barrier to its application on a
large scale. In particular, when the calculations are all done in
simulation over a classical computing platform. Nevertheless,
we show the feasibility of the approach on a small scale
and identify hurdles that are likely to be overcome by the
upcoming evolution of quantum machine learning.
Section II elaborates further on our problem domain and
related work. Section III presents our solution. Section IV
provides experimental work. Section V concludes the paper1.
II. PROBLEM DOMAIN
The problem domain encompasses CPS controllers, play-
ing the role of defenders, and adversaries. We conceptualize
the situation in terms of activities consisting of gathering
and hiding knowledge about both defensive and adversarial
strategies. We envision the use of new learning theories,
in which defenders and adversaries conceal their actions to
avoid being profiled for the purpose of thwarting their cyber-
physical battle weapons. Defenders equipped with Artificial
Intelligence (AI) tools, such as machine learning, can be
1Accepted for publication in IEEE GLOBECOM 2019 Workshop on
Quantum Communications and Information Technology 2019 (fifth QCIT
workshop of the Emerging Technical Committee on Quantum Communi-
cations and Information Technology, QCIT-ETC, cf. http://qcit.committees.
comsoc.org/qcit19-workshop/).
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identify adversarial actions trying to collect as much knowl-
edge as possible about their targets. The defense starts by
learning the weaknesses of the adversaries and offensively
mislead their intentions, thwarting their actions in the end.
Once the defender knows the adversary, e.g., the behavior
performed to identify and disrupt the services, the defender
starts offering assets sacrificed to coax the adversary and to
manage a potential security breach.
We are particularly interested in a type of CPS which func-
tion is air space surveillance and coastal water monitoring.
The application domain of interest includes Micro Aerial
Vehicles (MAVs) and related technologies such as UAV,
UUV, formations of MAVs and collaborating MAVs. We
focus on scenarios where an adversary targets the components
of the CPS and perpetrates covert cyber-physical attacks [27],
[26]. The adversary is to operate a stealthy disruption of
services. The purpose is disrupting the navigation data of the
MAVs and deceive the defender. The role of the defender
is to recognize the activities performed by the adversary,
i.e., identify the intentions of the adversary and correct the
adversarial actions.
A. Covert Attack and Feedback Truthfulness
A covert attack is an aggression on the state of a CPS
where the adversary attempts to be invisible [27]. It is as-
sumed that the adversary knows or can learn the dynamics of
the CPS. While the attack is being carried out, the perpetrator
compensates the impact of the attack over the system by
providing fake information to the system operators (e.g., by
concealing the effect of the spoofed inputs). Hence, from the
point of view of an observer, responsible for detecting the
attack, the execution of the CPS looks normal. Assume the
scenario shown in Figure 1. It depicts the disruption of the
navigation data of a series of MAVs. The manipulation is
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Fig. 1. MAV navigation data trace disruptions. The adversary perpetrates
GPS-like attacks [1], [12], e.g., to swap the navigation coordinates. Solid
lines represent genuine navigation data. Dashed lines represent disrupted
navigation data. (a) Swapping of the x coordinate. (b) Swapping of the y
coordinate. (c) Swapping of the x,z coordinates. (d) Swapping of the x,y,z
coordinates.
(a)
(b)
Fig. 2. (a) MAV genuine navigation data. (b) Extract of some MAV
navigation data disrupted by GPS attacks (solid lines represent genuine
navigation data; dashed lines represent spoofed navigation data).
conducted by a remote adversary via, e.g., GPS jamming
and spoofing attacks [1], [12]. The goal of the adversary
is to conduct navigation data modifications (e.g., swapping
the x,y coordinates of the navigation traces) and hide the
disruption to the defender, with additional cyber-physical
covert attacks [27], [26].
Assume now the merge of multiple navigation traces of
a single MAV over a given period of time, as depicted in
Figure 2. The expected navigation data seen by the CPS
controller is depicted in Figure 2(a). The spoofed navigation
data, due to the adversarial attacks, is depicted by the dashed
lines in Figure 2(b). The covert attack conducted by the
adversary conceals the alteration of some of the navigation
paths. The defender conducts a learning process to guess the
adversarial intentions. The defender also prioritizes assets
that can get sacrificed as collateral damages (e.g., to offer
some tactical victories to the adversary with the aim of
reducing the adversarial power in the long term), e.g., by
using some game-theoretic ideas. The process allows the
defender to get trusted by the adversary, i.e., to make the
adversary confident about the success of some perpetrated
actions. Practically speaking, the collateral damages allow
the defender to reinforce the defensive learning processes,
with the aim of handling and correcting the affected system
represented by Figure 2(b), to the original plans before the
execution of the adversarial actions (i.e., Figure 2(a)). Both
graphs (the one seen by the defender and the one seen by
the adversary) evolve dynamically over time, and converge
eventually. Successful victories of the learning process con-
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ducted by the defender increases the converge likelihood of
the two graphs.
B. Related Work
Related work include the use of machine learning for
cyber-physical protection, management of data quality (w.r.t.
feedback-control systems), use of security games and com-
petitive learning. More detailed information follow.
1) CPS Protection Using Machine Learning: The domain
of AI, by means of the subfields of search and machine
learning, provides a large set of techniques relevant to the
resilience of a CPS. Supervised, unsupervised and reinforce-
ment are the three main machine learning paradigms. In
supervised machine learning, there are old and new data
points. Old data points are labelled, representing classes
of data points. Comparing their similarity with old ones,
supervised machine leaning assigns labels to new data points.
With unsupervised machine learning, the data points are
unlabelled. Learning consists of extracting information from
data. Data points are grouped together into classes according
to similarity. Human experts label the classes.
In contrast, reinforcement learning rewards or penalizes
the learner following the validity of inferred classifications.
Learning is from the successes and mistakes. Supervised
and reinforcement machine learning is used for system
identification and model fitting. Different alternative learn-
ing methods exist, based on different considerations on the
type of model (e.g., rule-based, support-vector machines,
deep learning models) and its properties (e.g., explainable
models/decisions, efficiency). The perpetration of control-
theoretic attacks [27], [26] may require a system identifica-
tion phase performed by the adversary. Kernels methods [25],
a kind of machine learning, can be used for system identifi-
cation [19], [20].
2) Data Quality and Source Heterogeneity: Learning
methods designed to recognize malicious activities within
large complex systems may be sensitive to the consequences
of merging data from very heterogeneous sources. The learn-
ing process can be impacted by poor data quality, affecting
the reliability of the decisions that are made. For example,
data sources can be unmalicious but of little confidence.
This issue is important for the protection of the learning
phase. Adequate risk management calls for the implemen-
tation of data quality evaluation. Discriminators must be
designed to cope with operational data relatively different and
considerably more inaccurate than the training data. Taking
into account data quality prevents bias and integrity attacks
aiming to deceive a discrimination process [18]. Conversely,
discrimination algorithms affected by slight modifications of
training data may be too sensitive. They can be exploited
more easily by adversaries. There are trade offs that can
be taken into account by a security game modeling risk
management. An interesting avenue is considering the pos-
sibility of a classifier not producing an answer when data
quality cannot be guaranteed. This behavior corresponds to
the rejection principle. A concept relatively well known by
the classification community. However, to the best of our
knowledge, its application to security needs more thought [6].
3) Security Games and Competitive Learning: In [2], the
authors propose a taxonomy to characterize the different
types of attacks targeting AI-based security approaches, for
example, machine learning classification and discrimination
techniques taking security decisions. This taxonomy focuses
on the techniques employed to identify malicious artifacts
such as, messages, codes, program inputs and outputs. The
work suggests to complement machine learning with game-
theoretic security approaches, specially those in which the
adversary may alter the training data. These observations
have been widely repeated and extended in the information
security literature [17].
In this context, the principle of a security game amounts
to quantifying the adversarial resources required to attack a
system and the defensive capabilities of the latter. In this
way, it is possible to determine optimal configurations to
manage the risks of attacks as a quest for defender vs.
adversary equilibrium. Along these lines, authors in [18]
insists on the importance of using learning techniques with
access to real time data. Outdated data increases the risk of
making incorrect decisions by a defender [13]. Data must be
considered obsolete by a learning process at a certain point
in time [4]. The use of utility functions can be provided
to formulate more realistic games. Such functions do not
necessarily need to be under the classical computing realm.
Extended machine learning functions relying on quantum
techniques are expected [24].
4) The Quantum Advantage: The time complexity of
quantum search techniques are data size independent. Along
the same line, quantum machine learning, i.e., the use of
quantum computing for machine learning, has great potential
because the time complexity of classification is independent
of the number of data points. Schuld and Killoran investigated
the use of kernel methods [25], that can be used for system
identification, for quantum machine learning [24], [23]. En-
coding of classical data into a quantum state is needed. A
similar approach has been proposed by Havlı´cˇek et al. [11].
Schuld and Petruccione [24] discussed in details the appli-
cation of quantum machine learning classical data generation
and quantum data processing. A translation procedure is
required to map the classical data, i.e., the data points,
to quantum data, enabling quantum data processing, i.e.,
quantum classification. However, there is a cost associated
with translating classical data into the quantum form, which
is comparable to the cost of classical machine learning clas-
sification. This is right now the main barrier. The approach
that will result in real gains is quantum data generation and
quantum data processing, there will be no need to translate
from classical to quantum data. Quantum data generation
requires quantum sensing.
3
III. FAKING AND DISCRIMINATING NAVIGATION DATA
Using the Generative Adversarial Network (GAN) frame-
work, we validate that a covert attack can be perpetrated using
adversarial learning. A GAN consists of two main entities: a
discriminator and a generator [10]. The discriminator is the
defender’s tool. The generator is the adversary tool. There are
genuine (real) data and generated (fake) data. The generator
aims at generating data to deceive the discriminator. The
discriminator is trained with genuine and generated data.
The training process aims to a discriminator able to label
genuine or generated data correctly, with high probability
of correctness. The adversary wins the game when this
probability is at least 50%. To this end, the generator is
trained, assuming it can challenge the discriminator with data
and access to the verdict. Training is an iterative process.
Training iterates until the production of fake data is accepted
by the discriminator with high probability.
In a QGAN [5], [15] the data can be quantum. Using a
Parrot Mambo MAV, we generate genuine navigation data.
The navigation is classical and in continuous domains. Using
probability amplitude encoding, the genuine (classical) data
is mapped to quantum data and used to train a discriminator,
defined as a qubit-quantum circuit. Using a photonic-quantum
circuit, we validate that the adversary can learn to generate
fake data resembling genuine data, assuming access to noth-
ing else but the verdict of the discriminator.
A. Discriminator Design
We build upon the PennyLane [3] variational classifier [21]
and QGAN [22] examples. The elementary circuit design
Elementary circuit E (ω)
|ψ0〉 Rot(ω0,0,ω0,1,ω0,2) •
|ψ1〉 Rot(ω1,0,ω1,1,ω1,2) •
|ψ2〉 Rot(ω2,0,ω2,1,ω2,2) •
Fig. 3. Three-qubit elementary circuit layer.
E (ω) of Farhi and Neven [8] is used, pictured in Figure 3.
Every elementary circuit processes n qubits. In Figure 3, n
is three. The circuit formal parameter ω is a n by three
matrix of rotation angles. For i = 0,1, . . . ,n− 1, the gate
Rot(ωi,0,ωi,1,ωi,2) applies the x, y and z-axis rotations ωi,0,
ωi,1 ωi,2 to qubit |ψi〉. The three rotations can take a qubit
from any state to any state. For entanglement purposes, qubit
i is connected to qubit i+ 1 modulo n using a CNOT gate.
The discriminator circuit D(ω) uses m layers of elementary
circuits E . In Figure 4, m is two. Layer 0 accepts the input.
Discriminator circuit D(ω)
|ψ0〉
E E
r
|ψ1〉
|ψ2〉
Fig. 4. Discriminator circuit made of two layered elementary circuits.
Layer i quantum outputs are connected to layer i+1 quantum
inputs. In this case, the circuit formal parameter ω is a m by
n by three matrix of rotation angles. Layer i is actualized
with sub-matrix ωi.
We use probability amplitude encoding, because we can
represent in a given number of qubits an exponential number
of data points. Probability amplitude encoding requires nor-
malized data. Let x0, . . . ,xn−1 be the data values, their normal
form is
v0 = x0/µ, . . . ,vn−1 = xn−1/µ
where
µ =
√
x20+ . . .+ x
2
n−1.
With probability amplitude encoding, up to 2n single scalar
values can be represented in probability amplitudes in the
input circuit quantum state. The input quantum state with
probability amplitude encoded data has the following format:
|ψ〉=
n−1
∑
i=0
vi |i〉 (1)
In Figure 4, layer m−1 produces the output expectation r
on line 0. The output r ranges in the continuous interval +1
down to -1, respectively corresponding to qubits |0〉 and |1〉.
Intermediate values represent superpositions of qubits |0〉 and
|1〉. The output is interpreted as follows. When it is +1, the
data is accepted as true. When it is −1, the data is rejected
and considered fake. The output r is converted to a probability
value, in the interval [0,1], using the following conversion:
p =
r+1
2
. (2)
When genuine data is submitted on the inputs (|ψ〉) of the
discriminator, the value p in Eq. (2) expresses the probability
of real true pR. When fake data submitted, the value p
corresponds to the probability of fake true pF .
We aim to a discriminator that maximizes the probability
pR of accepting true data while minimizing the probability
pF of accepting fake data. An optimizer finds a rotation angle
matrix ω such that the output of the circuit is approaching
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+1, which corresponds to qubit |0〉. Using a gradient descent
technique, the optimizer iterates with genuine data sets and
fake data sets. Gradient descent means that the optimizer tries
to minimize the cost represented by the difference pF − pR.
Definition 1 (Discriminator optimization problem): Given
the quantum input state φ , probability amplitude encoding
fake navigation data, and quantum input state ψ , probability
amplitude encoding genuine navigation data, training the
discriminator D(ω) is the optimization problem that consists
of finding the matrix ω (m× n× 3) that gives the smallest
difference pF − pR.
B. Generator Design
The aim of the generator is to produce fake data that is
accepted as true by the discriminator, i.e., the probability of
fake true pF is as close to one as possible. When training the
generator, it is assumed that the adversary can submit its fake
data to the discriminator and access to the verdict. For the
generator, we investigated the three following designs: (1)
a first generator using a MAV model, (2) a qubit-quantum
circuit, and (3) a photonic quantum circuit.
1) MAV model design: A detailed model of the MAV is
built and evolved. For example, such a model does exist
for the MAV we are using for our experiments [16]. The
continuous domain navigation data generated by the MAV
model is amplitude-encoded and submitted to the discrim-
inator. According to the output of the discriminator, the
MAV model is fine tuned until a high probability of fake
data acceptance is reached. The challenge with this approach
is that the adversary needs a detailed understanding of the
dynamics of the MAV. We aim at a method that does require
no knowledge on the part of the adversary about the MAV
dynamics. In other words, we aim at an automated learning
process. Two alternative designs for such a purpose follow.
Generator circuit Discriminator circuit
|0〉
E E E E
r
|0〉
|0〉
Fig. 5. Generator qubit circuit feeding the discriminator circuit.
2) Qubit-quantum Circuit: The fake data can be generated
with a qubit-quantum circuit, with an architecture as the one
pictured in Figure 5. The generator circuit is similar to the
discriminator circuit, pictured in Figure 4. For the generator
circuit, the inputs are all at |0〉. The optimization is done on
the rotation angles, using the verdict of the discriminator r.
The learning process is automatic. The generator outputs the
navigation data with entropy. The outputs of the generator
are directly connected to the inputs of the discriminator.
The generated navigation data is encoded in the probability
amplitudes of the quantum state produced by the generator.
Although it works, the navigation data must be transformed to
a quantum format. Hence, the data is unusable for practically
perpetrating the attack. Indeed, qubit-circuit outputs, obtained
through measurements, collapse to zeros and ones. To be
usable in an attack scenario, the data needs to be transformed
from classical continuous domains. An alternative design for
such a purpose follows next.
3) Photonic quantum circuit: The generator combines
photonic quantum computing [14] and qubit-quantum com-
puting. Photonic devices are trained to generate photon
Single-qumode photonic circuit
|0〉 D(α) R(φ)
Fig. 6. Photonic-cricuit model.
numbers corresponding to navigation data accepted by the
discriminator. A photonic quantum circuit is shown in Fig-
ure 6. It has a single line, called a qumode. The input of the
circuit, |0〉, is the zero energy level. There are two Gaussian
devices. There is a displacement gate D, with parameter α ,
and a rotation gate R, with parameter φ . They change the
circuit energy level and expected numbers of output photons.
The measurement gate determines the average number of
photons at the output of the circuit.
We use photonic devices to generate fake navigation data.
The output is amplitude-encoded and submitted to the dis-
criminator. The photonic-quantum circuit is optimized on the
parameters α and φ such that the probability of acceptance
of the fake data by the discriminator is high.
The architecture pictured in Figure 7 shows a gener-
ator feeding a discriminator circuit through a probability
amplitude encoder A , including normalization. The MAV
navigation data set is amplitude encoded according to Eq. (1).
Since n qubits can amplitude-encode 2n datum, a n-qubit
discriminator is fed by a generator with 2n qumodes. In
Figure 7, n is two.
The generator is initialized with arbitrary displacements
and rotation angles (α and φ ). A gradient descent optimizer is
used to minimize the cost represented by the term −pF . The
outcome of the optimization of the generator is two column
vectors of displacements and rotation angles, 2n rows each,
actualizing the generator circuit such that the probability that
fake data is recognized as true is high.
Definition 2 (Generator optimization problem): Given the
quantum input state ψ , probability amplitude encoding fake
navigation data, the discriminator D(ω), actualized with
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Generator circuit G (α,φ) Discriminator circuit D(ω)
|0〉 D(α0) R(φ0)
A
E E
|0〉 D(α1) R(φ1)
|0〉 D(α2) R(φ2)
|0〉 D(α3) R(φ3)
Fig. 7. Generator qubit circuit feeding the discriminator circuit (n is two) .
rotation angle matrix ω , training the generator G (α,φ) is
the optimization problem that consists of finding the column
vectors of the rotation angles α and φ (2n rows each) that
gives the smallest difference −pF .
The learning process is automatic. The output of the
photonic quantum circuit is classical and in the continuous
domain. It is directly usable by the adversary to generate fake
navigation data during a covert attack. The circuit complexity
is although in O(2n).
IV. PERFORMANCE
The performance of the photonic-circuit design described
in Section III has been validated through simulation on a
classical computing platform. Simulations were conducted
using an Intel Xeon 32-core 2.70 GHz server, with 256 GB
of memory. We generated genuine navigation for a Parrot
Mambo MAV. In the scenario, the MAV takes off one meter.
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Fig. 8. Learning time (ms) versus the number of qubits for the discriminator
and generator.
Does two circles on the horizontal plane, then lands. The
navigation data consists of x, y and z velocity triples. The
whole scenario generates less than 64 real number values.
Figure 8 plots the discriminator and generator learning
time (ms) versus the number of qubits available. The x axis
represents the number of qubits. The left y axis refers to the
learning time (ms). The right y axis shows the corresponding
probability of real true, for the discriminator, and probability
of fake true, for the generator. Hundred optimization iter-
ations were done for each case. Negligible error margins
are included, but not visible since they are very tiny. The
discriminator is trained with six different genuine navigation
data sets. A navigation data set is picked at random at every
optimization iteration. The discriminator optimization time
grows exponentially. Due to the exponential complexity of
the generator circuit (in O(2n)), the optimization time also
grows exponentially. On our simulation platform, it becomes
unpractical from six qubits. The learning time becomes in
the order of days. Amplitude encoding has also O(2n) time
complexity, but it is only executed once at the start of the
optimization process.
V. CONCLUSION
We have investigated the use of QGAN designs to generate
fake MAV navigation data. We assume the same approach
to discriminate between genuine and fake MAV navigation
data. The goal pursued by the adversary is to generate fake
data that is accepted as true by a trained discriminator. On
the other hand, the discriminator must accept with high
probabilities true navigation data and reject fake one. The
elaborated quantum circuits have been evaluated running
on a a classical computing platform. As demonstrated in
Figure 8, the exponentially growing time complexity in the
number of qubits is an obstacle to scalability. We identified
hurdles that must be overcome by the upcoming evolution
of quantum machine learning. The main hurdle for the
adversary is the generation of navigation data in classical
continuous domains, i.e., real numbers, and the cost of the
transformation into the quantum format at every optimization
iteration. Further research is needed to improve and find
alternatives to the design depicted in Figure 7.
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